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The relationship between economic growth and pollution is very complex, depending 
upon a host of different factors. Thus the study of this phenomenon represents a 
challenging endeavor. While most economics papers begin with theory and support that 
theory with econometric evidence, the literature on Environmental Kuznets Curves has 
proceeded in the opposite direction: first developing an empirical observation about the 
world, and then attempting to supply appropriate theories. A number of papers have 
aimed at providing the theoretical underpinnings to the Environmental Kuznets Curve. 
Prominent here is the class of optimal growth models. These are usually studied from 
the point of view of the analytical conditions that must hold in order to obtain an 
inverted-U functional relationship between pollution and growth. These models are 
however seldom confronted with the data. In this paper we take one popular optimal 
growth model designed for climate change policy analysis and carry out a few 
simulation exercises with the purpose of characterizing the relationship between 
economic growth and emissions. In particular, we try to assess the relative contribution 
of the ingredients of the well-known decomposition of the environment-growth 
relationship put forth by Grossman (1995): according to it, the presumed inverted-U 
pattern results from the joint effect of scale, composition, and technology components. 
We do this focusing on the developed regions of the world and on a global pollutant, 
CO2 emissions. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The relationship between economic development and environmental quality is the subject of a 
long-standing debate. Precisely thirty years ago a number of respected scholars, mostly social 
and physical scientists, attracted the public attention to the growing concern that the economic 
expansion of the world economy will cause irreparable damage to our planet. That concern 
stems from two rather intuitive concepts: first, more output requires more inputs so that the 
earth’s natural resources (including exhaustible energy sources) will be quickly depleted; 
second, more output causes more emissions and waste: the earth could soon exceed the carrying 
capacity of the biosphere. In the famous volume The Limits to Growth (Meadows, Meadows, 
Randers, and Behrens, 1972), the members of the Club of Rome ventilated the necessity that, in 
order to save the environment and even the economic activity from itself, economic growth 
cease and the world make a transition to a steady-state economy (see Ekins, 2000, for a more 
thorough discussion of this position). 
 
In the last decade the economists’ view about the relationship between economic growth and 
environmental quality has prevailed: increase in the former does not necessarily mean 
deterioration of the latter; in current jargon, a de-coupling or de-linking is possible, at least after 
certain levels of income. This is the basic tenet at the heart of the so-called Environmental 
Kuznets Curve (EKC henceforth), the empirical reduced-form relationship that has been widely 
investigated in the last ten years.
1 
 
A spat of initial influential studies, Grossman and Krueger (1993, 1995), Shafik and 
Bandyopadhyay (1992), Panayotou (1993), Shafik (1994), Selden and Song (1994) identified, 
mostly in the case of local air and water pollutants, a bell shaped curve for the pollution-GDP 
curve. This behavior implies that, starting from low per capita income levels, per capita 
emissions or concentrations tend to increase but at a slower pace. After a certain level of income 
(which typically differs across pollutants) – the “turning point” – emissions or concentrations 
start to decline as income further increases. It must be said that in the case of global pollutants 
like CO2 the evidence is less clear-cut.   
 
Although appealing to many – policy makers, politicians, scholars, sectors of the public opinion 
– the main problem with the EKC is its reduced form nature. Being based on no firm theoretical 
basis, the EKC is ill-suited for drawing policy implications. The inverted-U relationship 
between economic growth and the environment cannot be simply exported to different 
institutional contexts, to different countries with different degrees of economic development, 
not even to different pollutants. 
 
The consideration just made represents the motivation underlying the crop of recent papers 
aiming at the study of the EKC relationship from a theoretical viewpoint. What these studies 
basically do is to lay out a theoretical model and derive the implied relationship linking GDP 
growth to pollution. On this basis they then study the analytical conditions on key model 
parameters that ensure an inverted-U shape. 
  
Various types of theoretical models can be employed for such endeavor, from very simple to 
quite complex ones. However, it appears that, given the phenomenon under scrutiny, growth 
models – specifically, optimal growth models – are the natural candidate for the purpose. While 
there is no lack of growth models with pollution designed for this task in the literature, 
                                                           
1 Many empirical investigations on the EKC have been conducted, as well as a limited number of 
theoretical studies attempting a rationalization of the inverted-U pattern. By now also an increasing 
number of survey papers have appeared, including a companion paper to the present one (Galeotti, 2002). CLIMATE POLICY AND ECONMIC GROWTH IN DEVELOPED COUNTRIES   
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surprisingly no one has been confronted with actual data.
2 At the same time, the literature 
dealing with climate change has proposed a number of models which can be simulated in order 
to gain insights on the problem and its economic implications, but no one appears to have been 
put to study explicitly the environment–development nexus from the EKC perspective. 
 
This is the tack of the present chapter. We first consider the conceptual basis offered for 
econometrically estimated EKCs. A fundamental and well-known decomposition attributes the 
resulting inverted-U pattern to the joint working of a scale, a technical, and a composition 
effect. We present this in Section 2. In Section 3 we provide a short overview of theoretical 
work on EKCs. We next describe one of the most popular models for climate change analysis. 
There we emphasize the importance of technical change. In Section 5 we simulate such model 
to assess its properties in terms of the growth-environment relationship. Moreover, we focus in 
particular on CO2 and on developed countries. Concluding comments close the paper. 
 
 
2.  Conceptual Aspects of the Environmental Kuznets Curve 
 
Far from being provided with theoretical underpinnings, the inverted-U Environmental Kuznets 
Curve has been rationalized with reference to a few alternative, possibly competing   
explanations. These are the so-called “stage of growth” hypothesis, the role of technical 
progress, and the role of environmental quality being a luxury good for individuals (see 
Galeotti, 2002). 
 
The conceptual basis of the EKC has been identified in three effects jointly at work. Grossman 
(1995) first proposed to distinguish three main channels through which economic growth affects 
the environment. Firstly, there is a scale effect: a larger scale of economic activity leads per se 
to increased environmental degradation. This occurs because increasing output requires that 
more inputs and thus more natural resources are used up in the production process. In addition, 
more output also implies increased wastes and emissions as by-product of the economic 
activity, which contributes to worsen the environmental quality. If the scale effect has negative 
implications for the environment, a positive impact is associated with a composition effect: as 
income grows, the structure of the economy changes, with a gradually increasing share of 
cleaner activities in GDP. Finally, technological progress often occurs with economic growth 
since a wealthier country can afford to spend more on research and development. This generally 
leads to the substitution of obsolete and dirty technologies with cleaner ones, which also 
improves the quality of the environment. This is known as the technique effect of growth on the 
environment. Technical change is not however per se always environment-friendly, as it can 
lead to the emergence of new sectors and industries with new kinds and degrees of pollution 
problems, like the generation of new harmful pollutants. 
 
An inverted-U relationship between environmental degradation and per capita income suggests 
that the negative impact on the environment of the scale effect tends to prevail in the initial 
stages of growth, but that it will eventually be outweighed by the positive impact of the 
composition and technique effects that tend to lower the emission level. 
 
The above considerations can be also put in a more formal way. Following Panayotou (2000), 
emissions (E) in period t in a country are given by the following identity: 
 
                                                           
2 An exception is given by Ansuategi and Escapa (2002), who use a numerically calibrated overlapping 
generations model of climate-economy interactions for EKC analysis.   4
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where Yt  is GDP, Ejt is emissions from sector j and Yjt is sectoral GDP or value added. The ratio 
Ijt=Ejt / Yjt is j-th sector emission intensity and Sjt=Yjt / Yt is the share of j-th sector GDP in total 
economy GDP. Differentiating equation (1) with respect to time and dividing the derivatives by 
Et, we obtain Grossman (1995)’s decomposition equation: 
 































where ejt is j-th sector share of emissions in total emissions (i.e. ejt = Ejt / Et) and where a dot 
over a variable denotes time differentiation. The first term on the right-hand side of (2) reflects 
the “scale effect”, the second term the “composition effect” effect and the third term the 
“technological change effect.”  A discrete approximation of the Grossman decomposition 
equation was tested by de Bruyn (1997) for commercial SO2 emissions during 1980-90 for West 
Germany and the Netherlands. The author found that technological change explained most of 
the reduction in those emissions, while structural change had little effect. This should not be 
surprising since both these countries are developed economies having undergone most of these 
structural changes prior to 1980. In contrast, there has been considerable technical change 
during the period especially in the form of policy-induced installation of end-of-the pipe 
abatement technology and more modest progress in terms of fuel substitution and use of more 
energy efficient technologies. 
 
 
3.  Theoretical Work on the Environmental Kuznets Curve 
 
As noted by Panayotou (2000) and Levinson (2001), the EKC literature consists of two distinct 
but related areas of research: an empirical strand – the majority - of mostly ad hoc specifications 
and estimation of a reduced form equation relating an environmental indicator to income per 
capita and a theoretical strand of models of the interaction between environmental degradation 
and economic growth. The latter includes optimal growth, endogenous growth and overlapping 
generations models. As documented in the previous section, the empirical models are built on 
heuristic theory or resort to ex post theoretical justifications of their findings rather than ex ante 
formal derivations from optimizing behavior or other theoretical constructs. At the same time, 
with a few exceptions, the results of theoretical models have not been subjected to rigorous 
empirical testing, but they are broadly consistent with the findings of the empirical literature. 
 
Panayotou (2000) gives a succinct overview of the theoretical contributions to the study of the 
interplay between environment and economic growth. According to the author they can be 
divided into four major categories: (i) optimal growth models; (ii) models in which the 
environment (rather than pollution) is a factor of production, (iii) endogenous growth models; 
and (iv) other macroeconomic models of growth and the environment. In particular: 
 
•  Optimal growth models build on the Ramsey-Koopmans-Cass framework. These are 
dynamic optimization models in which the utility maximization problem of the infinitely 
lived consumer is solved using the techniques of optimal control theory. Either the stock or CLIMATE POLICY AND ECONMIC GROWTH IN DEVELOPED COUNTRIES   
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the flow of pollution is an argument of both the production function and the utility function 
of the representative consumer. Most of these models support the Environmental Kuznets 
Curve that has been found empirically. Examples of this group are Tahvonen and 
Kuuluvainen (1994), Selden and Song (1995), and Stokey (1998).  
•  Models of the environment as a factor of production include not only pollution as an 
argument of production and utility functions, but the environment itself. This may be 
interpreted as the stock of natural capital that the economy is endowed with or as the 
aggregate level of environmental quality. In these models property rights are decisive in 
determining whether environmental degradation eventually declines with growth. Examples 
of this group are Lopez (1994) and Chichilinsky (1994). 
•  Endogenous growth models relax the neoclassical specification of the production function 
assumed in the optimal growth models. Production functions in these models are of the 
Romer’s type, that is they are characterized by increasing returns to scale and spillover 
effects. Tightening pollution standards with economic growth is optimal in these models. 
Examples of this group are Lighthard and van der Ploeg (1994), Bovenberg and Smulders 
(1995, 1996), and Stokey (1998). 
•  Other macroeconomic models include Diamond-type overlapping generation models. These 
models add support to the results of the optimal growth models and suggest that their results 
may be arrived at in other contexts as well. Examples are John and Pecchenino (1994)  and 
Jones and Manuelli (2000). In this residual category we can also include simple static 
models like the one outlined by Stokey (1998) and the Robinson Crusoe – static, one good, 
one person, one period – model of Andreoni and Levinson (2001). 
 
Much like econometrically estimated reduced form EKCs lack a firm theoretical basis, the 
above theoretical models have not been, to our knowledge, confronted with the data. It is 
therefore difficult to discern among competing classes of theoretical models and select the most 
realistic ones. Models of optimal growth are however prominent in a related area of 
environmental economics: the study of the impacts of climate change and of the corresponding 
mitigation policies. This field has seen its relevance increase after the discussion on global 
warming and the proposed international agreements (most notably the Kyoto Protocol) designed 
to cope with it. Models in this area are typically simulated over a number of future periods on 
the basis of actual data for a specific year and of parameters that are calibrated to existing 
estimates. Climate models usually deal with greenhouse gasses, chiefly carbon dioxide, a global 
pollutant. We know that in this case inverted-U EKCs are more difficult to identify. The reason 
lies in the global nature of such pollutant, which involves cross-border externalities, so that no 
one country has sufficient incentive to regulate emissions. The free rider problem may simply 
be more troublesome with carbon than any other pollutant. The evidence is however mixed (see 
Schmalensee, Stoker, and Judson, 1998; Galeotti and Lanza, 2002). 
 
It is of interest to analyze what climate change optimal growth models imply for the relationship 
between growth and the environment. In particular, it would be interesting to try to assess the 
relative role of individual effects, scale and technology, identified by Grossman (1995). These 
simulated models are among the few tools that lend themselves to such a purpose. We therefore 
turn to consider one of the most popular climate models. 
 
 
4.  A Popular Optimal Growth Model for the Study of Climate Change 
 
Nordhaus’s RICE is a well-known regional dynamic general equilibrium model for the study of 
the economic aspects of climate change (Nordhaus and Yang, 1996). It is basically a single 
sector optimal growth model suitably extended to incorporate the interactions between 
economic activities and climate. There is one such model for each of the six macro regions into   6
which the world is divided: USA, Japan, Europe, Former Soviet Union (FSU), China, and Rest 
of the World. 
 
Within each region a central planner chooses the optimal paths of fixed investment and of rate 
of pollution abatement that maximize the present value of per capita consumption. The value 
added created via production (net of climate change) is used for investment and consumption 
and is produced according to a constant returns Cobb-Douglas technology, which combines the 
inputs from capital and labor with the level of technology. Population (taken to be equal to full 
employment) and technology levels grow over time in an exogenous fashion, whereas capital 
accumulation is governed by the optimal rate of investment. 
 
As for climate, CO2 emissions are generated by output production. More specifically, emissions 
are equal to unabated output times a carbon intensity parameter that changes exogenously over a 
given time path. Emissions cumulate into carbon concentration which in turn produce an 
increase in temperature. The climate feeds back into the economy through a wedge between 
output produced and output available for consumption and investment: the damage function 
depends upon the temperature of the planet. 
 
While very popular, the RICE model – like many other such tools – is characterized by a 
process of technical change that is exogenous to the model itself. This is not very convenient in 
general, and is not useful for the scope of the present paper.
3 
 
In previous work we modified and extended the RICE model so as to allow for both endogenous 
and induced technical change (Buonanno, Carraro, Castelnuovo, and Galeotti, 2000, 2001; 
Buonanno, Carraro, and Galeotti, 2003). In particular, in that model – termed ETC-RICE – it 
was assumed that R&D investment accumulates into a stock of knowledge that affects both the 
production technology (endogenous technical change) and the emission-output ratio (induced 
technical change) (see also Nordhaus, 2002). Thus, the idea is that more knowledge will help 
firms increase their productivity and reduce their negative impact on the environment. In this 
modified version, the central planner in each country chooses also the optimal R&D effort that, 
in turn, increases the stock of technological knowledge. The amount of R&D is therefore a 
policy variable envisaged by the model. 
 
More recently, Castelnuovo, Galeotti, Gambarelli, and Vergalli (2002) proposed an alternative 
formulation of the same model that allows for an alternative source of technical change, 
Learning by Doing (LbD). In particular, it is supposed that the accumulation of knowledge 
occurs not as a result of deliberate (R&D) efforts, but as a side effect of conventional economic 
activity. In this extension of the RICE model, the authors model LdB in a simple way, by 
assuming that learning occurs as a side effect of the accumulation of new physical capital. This 
entails a production function that exhibits increasing returns to capital. In order to maintain the 
analogy with the R&D-based version of the model we also allow for the emission-output ratio to 
depend upon cumulated capacity, i.e. the sum of past physical investment efforts. It should be 
apparent that these model specifications make explicit reference to the recently developed 
theory of endogenous growth that emphasizes the role of knowledge, of physical and human 
capital, R&D activities, and LbD. 
 
4.1  Essential Elements of the Model: “Red Technical Change” 
 
                                                           
3 Among others, see Löschel (2001) for a survey of the role of technological change in economic models 
of environmental policy. CLIMATE POLICY AND ECONMIC GROWTH IN DEVELOPED COUNTRIES   
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To start with, we consider the specification of the model which only allows for endogenous 
technical change, i.e. the case in which knowledge affects only factor productivity. We will 
refer to this case as “red technical change”. In the case in which innovation is brought about by 
R&D spending, it is assumed that the stock of knowledge is a factor of production, which enters 
a country production technology along with physical capital and labor. Knowledge therefore 
enhances the rate of productivity. The RICE production function is as follows: 
 
() ()() () () []
γ γ β − =
1 , , , , , t n K t n L t n K t n A t n Q F R
R
n             (1a) 
 
where  Q is output (gross of climate change effects), A the exogenously given level of 
technology and KR, L and KF are respectively the inputs from knowledge capital, labor and 
physical capital (n and t index time and country respectively), γ and β
R are parameters. The 
stock of knowledge accumulates as follows: 
 
( ) () ( )() t n K t n D R t n K R R R , 1 , & 1 , δ − + = +                (2) 
 
where R&D are expenditures in Research and Development and δR is the rate of knowledge 
depreciation. Finally, R&D spending is included in the fundamental identity of sources and 
uses: 
 
() ()() () t n D R t n I t n C t n Y , & , , , + + =                ( 3 a )  
 
where C is consumption, I gross fixed capital formation and Y is output net of climate change 
effects, in accordance with the following expression: 
 
() () () t n Q t n t n Y ,   , , Ω =                    ( 4 )  
 
with  Ω being an output scaling factor that captures emissions controls and damages from 
climate change via increases in temperature.
4 
 
In the case of Learning by Doing equation (1a) has to be modified in a manner that enables a 
rise in productivity due to physical capital (installed capacity), without the contribution of KR in 
the production function. It is possible to formalise this idea by simply modifying the Cobb-
Douglas coefficients, so that returns to scale result to be increasing, given the augmented 
capital-output elasticity. Thus, equation (1a) is modified as follows: 
 
  () () () () [] () () () [ ]
L L
t n K t n L t n A K t n K t n L t n A t n Q F F F
β γ γ β γ γ + − − = = , ,   , , ,   , ,
1 1      (1b) 
 
where β
L can be referred to as the learning-by-doing coefficient. With LbD equation (2) is 
missing in this version of the model and equation (3a) reverts back to its original formulation in 
the RICE model: 
 
() ()() t n I t n C t n Y , , , + =               (3b) 
 
                                                           
4 The precise formulation of the damage function is reported in the appendix. One could suitably modify 
this function in order for the model to reproduce a bell-shaped EKC. We do not do this, as we modify 
Nordhaus’ original model version only in those respects that are crucial for rationalizing the EKC, that is 
technical change and regulation.   8
This implies that, under the LbD approach, knowledge creation does not place any claim on 
resources, ceteris paribus. 
 
4.2  Essential Elements of the Model: “Green Technical Change” 
 
As said above, besides affecting factor productivity, knowledge influences also the emissions-
output ratio. We refer to this case as “green technical change”. Following the R&D approach, it 
is assumed that the stock of knowledge, besides being a factor of production, also serves the 
purpose of reducing, ceteris paribus, the level of carbon emissions. Thus, R&D efforts prompt 
both environmental and non-environmental technical progress. More precisely, consider the 
RICE emissions-output relationship, whose original version is as follows: 
 
  () () [] () () , ,   ,   , 1 , t n Q t n t n t n E σ µ − =    () 1 , 0 ≤ ≤ t n µ           (5) 
 
where µ is the domestic abatement rate and σ is the exogenously given emissions-output ratio.  
Accounting for induced technical change, (5) is modified as follows: 
 








n α  is the region-specific elasticity through which knowledge reduces the emission-
output ratio, 
R
n χ  is a scaling coefficient, and σn is the value to which the emission-output ratio 
tends asymptotically as the stock of knowledge increases without limit. In this formulation, 
R&D contributes to output productivity on the one hand, and affects the emissions-output ratio, 
and therefore the overall level of pollution emissions, on the other hand.
5 
 
With a LbD-based knowledge accumulation, equation (5a) is simply replaced by the following: 
 




n n ,   , 1   , exp , µ α χ σ − − + =          (5b) 
 
where we substitute knowledge capital with physical capital. Hence, physical capital covers the 
role that knowledge capital has in the R&D approach, i.e. KF contributes to output productivity 
on the one hand, and affects the emissions-output ratio, and therefore the overall level of 
pollution emissions, on the other hand. 
 
4.3  Essential Elements of the Model: Regulation via Emission Trading 
 
The model provides for two forms of environmental regulation for each region. One is the rate 
of pollution abatement, which is however one of the choice variables of the model and as such 
difficult to switch on and off without fundamentally altering the working of the model. The 
other possibility is the imposition of an exogenous ceiling to emissions. However, this case 
would not be very informative because, as a country grows, it sooner or later reaches the limit 
after which income may increase but emissions do not. The shape of the income-pollution 
relationship would not be interesting to study. As an alternative, we can think of imposing an 
upper limit to world emissions that cannot be overcome, and assigning region-specific limits 
which however may or may not be exceeded by interregional trade of rights to emit. This type 
                                                           
5 Of course R&D efforts may or may not be successful in producing a commercially viable innovation. 
No account is taken in this model of the uncertainty surrounding that process. Sensitivity analysis with 
respect to the relevant parameters ought to be carried out, but this is beyond the scope of the present 
paper. CLIMATE POLICY AND ECONMIC GROWTH IN DEVELOPED COUNTRIES   
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of regulation is precisely what is implied by the Kyoto Protocol when use is made of 
international emission trading, its main flexibility mechanism. In this way, we can switch on 
and off the possibility of trading. 
Going back to the model specification, when considering emission trading, two additional 
equations have to be included. The first one accounts for the new burden that emissions permits 
represent in the fundamental sources and uses identity. Hence, equations (3a) and (3b) have to 
be respectively replaced by the following:  
 
() ()() () ( ) () t n NIP t p t n D R t n I t n C t n Y , , & , , , + + + =                 (6a) 
 
() ()() ( ) () t n NIP t p t n I t n C t n Y , , , , + + =             (6b) 
 
In addition, equation (7) states that the Kyoto limits can be relaxed in the case of emission 
trading: 
 
() ( ) () t n NIP n Kyoto t n E , , + ≤                           (7) 
 
The variable NIP represents the net demand for permits, while Kyoto is the emission target set 
in the Kyoto Protocol for each one of the signatory countries and the BAU (Business As Usual) 
levels for the non-signatory ones. According to (6a) and (6b), resources produced by the 
economy must be devoted, in addition to consumption, investment and, in (6a), research and 
development, to net purchases of emission permits. Equation (7) states that a region’s emissions 
may exceed the limit set in Kyoto if permits are bought, and vice versa in the case of sales of 
permits. Note that p(t) is the price of a unit of tradable emission permits expressed in terms of 
the numeraire output price. Moreover, there is an additional policy variable to be considered in 
this case, which is net demand for permits NIP. 
 
Under the possibility of emission trading, the sequence whereby a Nash equilibrium is reached 
can be described as follows. Each region maximises its utility subject to the individual resource 
and capital constraints, now including the Kyoto constraint, and the climate module for a given 
emission (i.e. abatement) strategy of all the other players and a given price of permits p(t) (in 
the first round this is set at an arbitrary level). When all regions have made their optimal 
choices, the overall net demand for permits is computed at that given price. If the sum of net 
demands in each period is approximately zero, a Nash equilibrium is obtained; otherwise the 





5.  Simulating the Environment-Growth Relationship  
 
In this section we are interested in understanding the EKC implications of the climate model 
described above. In addition, the ability of controlling the model structure allows us to isolate 
individual effects, to turn on and off some relevant feature of the model, and carry out the 
associated simulations. In this way we can run some counterfactual exercises in order to assess 
the relevance of some of the factors determining the shape of the EKC. 
 
                                                           
6 The appendix reports the remaining equations that make up the full model.   10
We carry out the present exercise for the case of carbon dioxide. This is the greenhouse 
pollutant entertained by the RICE model. Both early and recent studies find that emissions of 
global pollutants - such as carbon dioxide (CO2) - either monotonically increase with income or 
start declining at income levels well beyond the observed range. The inability of finding a bell 
shaped relationship lies in the global nature of such pollutant, which involves cross-border 
externalities, so that no one country has sufficient incentive to regulate emissions. The free rider 
problem may simply be more troublesome with carbon than with any other pollutant. 
 
In the present case we limit our attention to the developed regions of the world considered in the 
RICE model, and precisely USA, Japan, and Europe. In addition, we present results also for 
another region, the Former Soviet Union (Russia and Eastern European countries), on the 
grounds that countries in this group belong to the so-called Annex B countries of the Kyoto 
Protocol. The reason why we concentrate on developed countries is because Grossman’s 
decomposition of the EKC applies primarily to the developed world. In this part of the world we 
can reasonably presume that scale, technology, and composition effects have played, partly if 
not fully, their role. 
 
The simulation period runs from 2000 to 2100. In order to analyze aspects of the EKC curve in 
developed countries, consider the following four effects determining the curve: 
 
•  a “green technology effect”, which ceteris paribus ought to decrease pollution; 
•  a “scale effect”, which ceteris paribus leads to an increase in emissions; 
•  a “composition effect”, which should produce a decrease in pollution; 
•  a “regulation effect”, which should contain emissions. 
 
In RICE the consumer has access to only a single produced good. Therefore the model is not 
suited for assessing the role of the composition effect. We can however run counterfactual 
simulations in which we suppress the role of environment-friendly “green” technical progress in 
all countries in every period and analyze scenarios in which regulation in the form of a ceiling 
to emissions is imposed together with the possibility of emission trading.
7 
  
The scenarios we consider are presented in Table 1. 
 





No green  technical progress 
No regulation  σn = 1; χn = 0 
Business-As-Usual 
(BAU) scenario 
Green  technical progress  
No regulation 
R&D-based: model equation (5a) 
LbD-based: model equation (5b)  BAU scenario 
No green technical progress 
Regulation  σn = 1; χn = 0 
Kyoto forever 
Annex B Trading 
Green technical progress  R&D-based: model equation (5a)  Kyoto forever 
                                                           
7 The role of Grossman’s effect is also investigated within the context of a computable general 
equilibrium model for Norway by Bruvoll, Fæhn, and Strøm (2002). CLIMATE POLICY AND ECONMIC GROWTH IN DEVELOPED COUNTRIES   
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Regulation  LbD-based: model equation (5b)  Annex B Trading 
 
The next four graphs present the results of the simulations for the scenarios outlined above 




Figure 1 considers the evolution of the world regions as described by the model when there is 
no upper limit to emissions and no endogenous “green” technical change operates in order to 
reduce the rate at which the unabated portion of output translates into emissions (equation (5) 
above). We have already noted that a single good model like the present one cannot properly 
account for the “stages of growth” explanations of bell-shaped EKC: the transition to different 
economic phases characterized by a different composition of output. Moreover, “red” technical 
change is active: R&D is undertaken or experience is built up in order to enhance the rate of 
output productivity which – ceteris paribus – produces harmful emissions. The results are in 
line with expectations: in the absence of green technical progress and regulation the 
environment-income relationship is monotonically increasing. Note that the world regions 
undertake some pollution abatement, but the incentives to do it in substantial amounts – absent 
any limitations to emissions generation – are extremely small. Note that our simulation show 
essentially no differences across the forms of green technical change (R&D vs LbD), and the 
steeper curve is that of the FSU followed by the USA, Europe and Japan. 
 
How do the above results change when we allow for endogenous green technical change? 
Regions now undertake optimally R&D efforts both for productivity enhancement but also for 
emission reduction, in addition to pollution abatement. Alternatively, not only does the past 
fixed investment activity increases output capacity but also contributes to increase experience 
which translates into a higher fixed capital (marginal) productivity. Countries are still 
unconstrained in the amount of emissions they can discharge into the atmosphere. And it is this 
fact that explains the trend in Figure 2, where we allow for endogenous “green” technical 
change but do not impose emission limits. Though less steep, the EKCs portrayed are still 
positively sloped and linear, with the significant exception of the Former Soviet Union in which 
case a clear concave shape emerges. Again, there are no differences across R&D and LbD 
formulations, but the amount of emissions is now halved relative to that of the previous case. 
 
The trend of the income-pollution relationship changes significantly when we allow for 
emission limits together with possibility of trading while switching off the source of 
environment-friendly technical change. Remarkably, Figure 3 shows that regulation turns the 
EKC relationship from positively to negatively sloped in the case of FSU and USA. While it is 
not easy to rationalize the decisively decreasing tendency of the FSU, the USA relationship after 
an initial reduction appears to stabilize. The emission-income line of Japan and Europe is 
instead still increasing but a slower pace than before. Finally, the level of emissions is lower 
than in the previous two cases. 
 
The final experiment is when we simulate the model enacting the emission trading market under 
the Kyoto Protocol and activating the process of endogenous technical change. This is done in 
Figure 4. Emissions per unit of income are no longer increasing but stabilize in the case of 
Europe and Japan. The USA seems to converge to the same level of pollution of the previous 
two regions. The FSU shows a decreasing but concave trend, suggesting also in this case a 
stabilization in per capita emissions toward the end of the simulation period. 
                                                           
8 Income and output are expressed in trillions of 1990 U.S. dollars, population in millions, emissions and 
energy consumption in Giga tons of carbon.   12
 
Before closing this section two final remarks, that apply to all simulations presented above, are 
in order. They both can be traced to the structure of the climate model employed. Firstly, notice 
that the model does not suggest significant differences as to the emission-output relationship 
between a R&D and a LbD formulation of endogenous technical change. In terms of the amount  
of emissions, some quantitative difference shows up only in the last and the only realistic 
simulation. Secondly, in all simulations Japan appears to grow more than all other regions, 
including the USA. Realism aside, this is probably due to the fact the USA “pay a higher price” 





The literature on the Environmental Kuznets Curve describing the relationship between income 
and environment has developed through empirical contributions rather than by theoretical 
advances. Several papers have often referred to Grossman (1995)’s decomposition of the 
environment-growth relationship that identifies a scale, a composition, and a technology effect 
to explain the inverted-U pattern. More recently, a number of papers have provided theoretical 
underpinnings to the Environmental Kuznets Curve. Prominent here is the class of optimal 
growth models. These are usually studied from the point of view of the analytical conditions 
that must hold in order to obtain an inverted-U functional relationship between pollution and 
growth. These models are however seldom confronted with the data. 
 
Optimal growth models are a fundamental tool of analysis in a related area of environmental 
economics: the study of climate change impacts and mitigation policies. These models are 
routinely simulated on the basis of actual data and calibrated parameters for scenario analysis  
and policy experiments.  
 
In this paper we have taken one popular climate model, based on Nordhaus’s RICE model, 
crucially highlighting the role of endogenous technical change. We have used it to run a number 
of simulations relevant for the purpose of characterizing the relationship between economic 
growth and emissions. In particular, in the light of Grossman’s decomposition, we have 
considered the relative role of scale, environment-friendly technology, and of environmental 
regulation on the income-emissions nexus, as well as GNP growth and carbon energy 
consumption. This is a novel exercise that adds to the understanding of the environment-income 
relationship, on the one hand, and to the comprehension of the structure and working of current 
climate change models, on the other. 
 
On the whole, the RICE model does not produce an inverted-U relationship between per capita 
CO2 pollution and income. It does however deliver a few useful messages. Firstly, emissions 
strongly increase when the world’s regions are “unregulated” and technical change is 
productivity enhancing. Secondly, a positive effect of “green” technical change is discernible in 
the sense that changes in the emission intensity over time induce a reduction in the positive 
slope of the environment-income relationship, but not enough to turn it negative. Only when 
regulation in the form of emission limits together with the possibility of emission trading is 
introduced, do economic growth and harmful emissions tend to be decoupled. We believe this to 
be an important policy message. 
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Figure 1: Model Simulations of Per Capita CO2 Emissions vs Per Capita Income 







































Note to the Figures: Income is expressed in trillions of 1990 U.S. dollars, population in millions, 
emissions in Gigatons of carbon. Per capita emissions are measured on the vertical axis, income per 
capita on the horizontal axis. 
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Figure 2: Model Simulations of Per Capita CO2 Emissions vs Per Capita Income 






























(b) LbD-based Model Version 
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Figure 3: Model Simulations of Per Capita CO2 Emissions vs Per Capita Income 
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Figure 4: Model Simulations of Per Capita CO2 Emissions vs Per Capita Income 





(a) R&D-based Model Version 
 


















(b) LbD-based Model Version 
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Appendix: The Remaining Elements of the Model 
 
In this appendix we reproduce the remaining equations that make up the whole model. These equations 
are reported here for the sake of completeness and are the same as the ones found in the original RICE 
model. 
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where L represents the exogenously evolving population, C is the absolute level of consumption, and β is 
the discount factor. By assumption population equals the employed labor force. The discount factor is 
exogenously given. The budget constraint is given by an equation like (3) in the main text. Clearly, the 
capital stock evolves as follows: 
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where I is the level of Investments in physical capital and δK is the rate of depreciation of capital stock. 
The process is the same as that for R&D. 
 
Turning to the climate module of the model, equation (4) in the main text shows the wedge existing 
between gross output Q and net output Y, justified by the negative effect exerted by the temperature level 
on the regions’ utilities. Changes in temperature are generated by emissions through a few equations 
described hereafter. 
 
First of all, the term Ω(n,t) in (4) is the just mentioned damage function with the following representation: 
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where µ is the domestic abatement rate controlled by each region, while T is the global temperature level, 
and b1, b2, θ1, and θ2 are parameters. 
 
Equation (5) and variants describe how emissions are generated by production activity, and depend also 
on the domestic effort against pollution as well as the environmental technology that each region enjoys. 
Over time, emissions accumulate and form the carbon concentration stock M: 
 
() ) ( 1 ) , ( ) 1 ( t M t n E t M M
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δ γ − + = + ∑           ( A . 1 0 )  
 
where γ is the marginal atmospheric retention ratio of CO2 emissions and δM is the rate of transfer of CO2 
from atmosphere to other reservoirs. The following step describes the relationship among the 
accumulation of greenhouse gases, the level of temperature, and climate change. The equations regulating 
the temperature level are: 
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where T is atmospheric temperature relative to pre-industrial level, T
* is deep ocean temperature relative 
to pre-industrial level, F represents the radiative forcing from all greenhouse gas concentrations, τ1, τ2, τ3, 
τ4 are parameters of the climate equation, λ is the feedback parameter in climate model (inverse to 
temperature-sensitivity coefficient), η is a parameter enhancing the carbon concentration impact on the 
radiative forcing, and O is an exogenously given force. 
 
Further information concerning the model structure, the calibration of parameters, and the simulation 
results under various policy regimes is found in Buonanno, Carraro, Castelnuovo, and Galeotti (2000, 
2001), Buonanno, Carraro, and Galeotti (2001), and Castelnuovo and Galeotti (2002).  
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